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and beliefs in human decision-making
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In uncertain and changing environments, optimal decision-making requires integrating reward
expectations with probabilistic beliefs about reward contingencies. Little is known, however,
about how the prefrontal cortex (PFC), which subserves decision-making, combines these
quantities. Here, using computational modelling and neuroimaging, we show that the ven-
tromedial PFC encodes both reward expectations and proper beliefs about reward con-
tingencies, while the dorsomedial PFC combines these quantities and guides choices that are
at variance with those predicted by optimal decision theory: instead of integrating reward
expectations with beliefs, the dorsomedial PFC built context-dependent reward expectations
commensurable to beliefs and used these quantities as two concurrent appetitive compo-
nents, driving choices. This neural mechanism accounts for well-known risk aversion effects
in human decision-making. The results reveal that the irrationality of human choices com-
monly theorized as deriving from optimal computations over false beliefs, actually stems from
suboptimal neural heuristics over rational beliefs about reward contingencies.
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Everyday life features uncertain and changing situationsassociated with distinct reward contingencies. In suchenvironments, optimal adaptive behaviour requires detect-
ing changes in external situations, which relies on making
probabilistic inferences about the latent causes or hidden states
generating the external contingencies of the agent experiences.
Previous studies show that humans make such inferences, i.e.,
they develop state beliefs to guide their behaviour in uncertain
and changing environments1–4. More speciﬁcally, the prefrontal
cortex (PFC) that subserves reward-based decision-making is
involved in inferring state beliefs about how reward contingencies
map onto choice options5–8. Optimal decision-making for driving
behaviour then requires integrating these state beliefs and reward
expectations through probabilistic marginalisation processes9.
This integration is required to derive reward probabilities asso-
ciated with choice options and to choose the option maximising
the expected utility10. Consistently, PFC regions involved in
inferring these state beliefs also exhibit activations associated with
reward expectations11–16.
However, human choices often differ from optimal choices
systematically17, raising the open issue of how the PFC combines
these state beliefs and reward expectations to drive behaviour. A
common hypothesis is that these quantities are integrated as
posited in the expected utility theory, but choice computations
derive from distorted representations of reward probabilities,
usually named subjective probabilities17–21. Yet the origin of
subjective probability remains unclear. As marginalisation pro-
cesses are complex cross-product processes9, the notion of sub-
jective probability might then reﬂect that state beliefs and reward
expectations are actually combined in a suboptimal way at var-
iance with the expected utility theory22. Thus, an alternative
plausible hypothesis is that state beliefs about reward con-
tingencies are processed as an additional value component that
contributes to choices independently of reward expectations
rather than through marginalisation processes, i.e., state beliefs
about reward contingencies act in decision-making as affective
values that combine linearly with the appetitive value of reward
expectations.
Here, we address this open issue using computational model-
ling and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). We
conﬁrm here that participants make decisions as if they mar-
ginalise reward expectations over state beliefs and compute
choices based on distorted subjective probabilities. Using a model
falsiﬁcation approach23, however, we show that participants’
performance varies with these subjective probabilities in a way
contradicting this theoretical construct. We then provide evi-
dence that participants’ choices actually derive from the inde-
pendent contribution of state beliefs regarding the most
frequently rewarded option and reward expectations based on an
efﬁcient coding mechanism of context-dependent value normal-
isation24–26. We identify the PFC regions involved in this decision
process combining linearly these state beliefs and reward expec-
tations, which at variance with the standard expected utility
theory, results in (1) the mutual dependence of option utilities
and (2) the processing of state beliefs as affective values rather
than probability measures in decision-making.
Results
Behavioural protocol. Twenty-two participants were asked to
make successive choices between two visually presented one-
armed bandits (square vs. diamond bandit, Fig. 1a) (Methods). In
every trial, each bandit proposed a potential monetary reward
varying pseudo-randomly from 2 to 10 €. One bandit led to
rewards more frequently (frequencies: qM= 80% vs. qm= 20%).
Following participants’ choices, the chosen-bandit outcome was
visually revealed, with zero indicating no rewards. Otherwise,
participants received the proposed reward approximately (±1 €).
Reward frequencies episodically reversed between the two bandits
(unpredictably every 16–28 trials), so that bandits’ reward fre-
quencies remained uncertain to participants. This uncertainty
induces the formation of probabilistic state beliefs about the
identity of the 80% and 20% rewarded bandit. In the neutral
condition, proposed rewards were independent of bandits, so that
beliefs could be inferred only from previous choice outcomes
(Fig. 1b). To properly dissociate belief probabilistic inferences
from reinforcement learning processes (RL), the protocol inclu-
ded two additional conditions (administered in separate days): in
the congruent condition, proposed rewards were biased towards
higher values for the more frequently rewarded bandit (and vice
versa), whereas in the incongruent condition, proposed rewards
were biased in the exact opposite direction. In both these con-
ditions, thus, proposed rewards identically convey some addi-
tional information about bandits’ reward frequencies dissociable
from reward values: beliefs could be inferred in every trial from
both previous choice outcomes and proposed rewards. Thus, the
protocol properly dissociated belief inferences from RL processes
over trials. Note also that due to the reversal/symmetrical struc-
ture of the protocol, the task required no exploration for max-
imising rewards: participants got the same information about
bandits’ reward frequencies, whatever the option they choose in
every trial.
In every trial, the optimal performance model (named model
OPT) forms probabilistic beliefs from previous trials about how
reward frequencies map onto bandits, updates these beliefs
according to proposed rewards and ﬁnally, chooses the bandit
maximising the (objective) expected utility by marginalising
reward expectations over beliefs27 (Methods). After reversals,
model OPT gradually acquires almost perfect beliefs and
regardless of conditions, starts selecting the true best bandit
(i.e., maximising reward frequencies x proposed rewards) almost
systematically (Fig. 1c). This optimal performance is reached
similarly in the congruent and incongruent conditions, but is
slower in the neutral condition. As expected, participants
performed suboptimally: after reversals, their performance
gradually reached a plateau, selecting the true best bandits with
a maximal frequency close to ~80% (corresponding to probability
matching) which in contrast to optimal performance, further
decreased monotonically from the congruent to neutral and
incongruent condition (mean over trials from trial#10, paired
T-tests: both Ts(21) > 2.97, ps < 0.01) (Fig. 1c).
Distortion models of human decision-making. To account for
human suboptimal performances, we ﬁrst considered the stan-
dard distortion hypothesis named model DIST17–19,21. This
model is identical to model OPT, except that choices maximise
the subjective expected utility of choice options involving: (1)
subjective probabilities distorting objective probabilities that
derive from marginalising reward expectations over state beliefs;
(2) subjective appetitive values distorting monetary values of
proposed rewards. We used the standard distortion function
encompassing all previously documented distortions (convex,
concave, S-shape and inverted S-shape) on reward probabilities
derived from state beliefs as well as on proposed rewards mod-
elling subjective appetitive values21 (Methods). Model DIST thus
includes four additional free parameters characterising such dis-
tortions with model OPT as a special case.
Suboptimal performances might also stem from RL processes
whereby the reward history of past choices biases current choices.
To assess this effect, we considered the extension of model DIST
(referred to as model DIST+RL) comprising an additional RL
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component based on the Rescorla & Wagner’s rule28 that alter the
subjective expected utilities of bandits (Methods).
Mixture models of human decision-making. As outlined in the
Introduction, the distortion hypothesis might reﬂect that state
beliefs and reward expectations are actually not integrated as
posited in the expected utility theory (i.e., as in models OPT and
DIST)22. First, the distortion over monetary values of proposed
rewards might actually reﬂect the recently proposed idea that
option utilities are encoded in the brain according to a context-
dependent divisive normalisation mechanism25,26, so that utilities
of choices’ options are mutually dependent. Second, the notion of
subjective probabilities distorting objective probabilities might
actually reﬂect that no marginalisation processes occur over
abstract state beliefs such as bandit i is rewarded with frequency qi
(as in models OPT and DIST). Instead, beliefs might bear upon
affective states such as bandit i is the most frequently rewarded
bandit, so that utilities and beliefs act as two normalised appetitive
value components contributing to choices independently, i.e.,
additively. These two hypotheses, utility-normalisation and affect-
additivity, are tightly linked because (1) affect-additivity requires
making utilities commensurable to probabilistic beliefs, thereby
leading to utility-normalisation; (2) model OPT with normalised
utilities and affective state beliefs is equivalent to maximising a
weighted sum of normalised utilities and affective state beliefs with
speciﬁc weights denoted 1–ω0 and ω0, respectively (Methods).
Accordingly, we proposed the more general decision-making
model (named model MIX) assuming that choices maximise a
linear combination of normalised utilities and affective state
beliefs with weighting parameters 1–ω and ω, respectively
(Methods). If ω signiﬁcantly differs from critical value ω0, choices
are unlikely to derive from computing bandits’ expected
normalised utilities based on marginalisation processes over
affective state beliefs. Moreover, ω > ω0 vs. ω < ω0 implies more
belief-based (risk-adverse) vs. more utility-based (risk-prone)
choices, respectively. Model MIX includes no distortion functions
but, according the context-dependent divisive normalisation25,26,
utilities v1, v2 of choice options correspond to proposed rewards
possibly altered by the reward history and normalised across the
two choice options:
vi ¼
φVproposedi þ ð1 φÞVRLiP
i¼1;2 φV
proposed
i þ ð1 φÞVRLi
 
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Fig. 1 Behavioural protocol. a trial structure. A square and diamond one-armed bandit with the offered rewards (euros) were presented on the screen
(maximal duration: 2.5 s) until participants chose one bandit by pressing one response button. The chosen bandit remained on display. A feedback centred
on the screen was then presented to reveal the bandit outcome (duration 1 s). One bandit led to proposed rewards (±1 €) more frequently (blue arrows
80% vs. 20%) but this advantage reversed episodically. The next trial started with the presentation of both bandits again. Response-feedback onset
asynchronies and intertrial intervals were uniformly and independently jittered (ranges: 0.1–4.1 s and 0.5–4.5 s, resp.). b Proposed rewards were biased in
opposite directions in the congruent and incongruent condition (exponential biases: slope=±0.13). c Proportions of choosing true best bandits (maximising
reward frequencies x proposed rewards) following reversals. Mean proportions over participants (blue, ±s.e.m, N= 22) and for optimal model OPT (black
line) are shown in the congruent, neutral and incongruent condition. Dashed line corresponds to the 80% reward frequency. **p < 0.01 (T-tests)
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where φ is a free weighting parameter, Vproposedi the monetary
value of proposed rewards and VRLi the RL-values associated with
bandits i.
Behavioural results. We ﬁtted all models assuming choices to
vary as a softmax function of decision variables with inverse
temperature β as free parameter. Consistent with previous studies
about experience-based choices19, model DIST exhibited major
sigmoid-like distortions on subjective probabilities with under-
and over-estimations of low and high probabilities, respectively
(Fig. 2c, Supplementary Table 1). Appetitive values of proposed
rewards further varied as the standard concave utility function of
monetary values posited in expected utility theory29 (Fig. 2c).
Importantly, model DIST simulations reproduced participants’
choices in every condition both in choosing true best bandits
along trial series following reversals (Fig. 2a) and in bandits’
choices according to proposed rewards (Fig. 2b) (T-tests, all
ps > 0.05). Moreover, model DIST ﬁtted participants’ behaviour
better than all its reduced models comprising fewer free para-
meters (including model OPT), even when penalising for
model complexity (Bayesian Information Criteria, paired T-tests,
DIST vs. reduced models: all Ts(21) > 8.0, ps < 10−7) (Methods).
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Fig. 2 Model DIST ﬁt to human performances. a Proportions of choosing true best bandits (maximising reward frequencies x proposed rewards) following
reversals. b Proportions of choosing proposed rewards. In a and b, mean proportions are shown in the congruent, neutral and incongruent condition for
ﬁtted model DIST (green) and participants (blue, ±s.e.m.). See Supplementary Fig. 1 for (parameterised) model OPT ﬁt. c Appetitive values of proposed
monetary rewards ~V(left) and subjective probabilities in inferred bandits’ reward probabilities ~P (right) in model DIST ﬁtting human choices (lines
correspond to distortion functions with mean parameters over participants). d Factorial analysis of choice log-odds over trials sorted according to
subjective probabilities ~P1 > ~P2vs: ~P1 < ~P2
 
, appetitive values of proposed rewards ~V1 > ~V2 vs: ~V1 < ~V2
 
and total appetitive values (~V1 þ ~V2, median split)
for ﬁtted model DIST simulations (green) and human data (blue). Both model DIST and participants exhibited main effects of subjective probabilities and
relative appetitive values (all Fs(1,21) > 23.7, ps < 0.00001) with no main effects of total appetitive values (both Fs < 1). However, model DIST unlike
participants exhibited an interaction between subjective probabilities and total appetitive values (DIST: F(1,21)= 2269, p < 0.00001. participants: F < 1).
e Same factorial analysis of choice log-odds adjusted for RL-values for ﬁtted model DIST+RL and human data (see text). Model DIST+RL exhibited main
effects of subjective probabilities, relative appetitive values and total appetitive values (all Fs(1,21) > 7.8, ps < 0.01), along with an interaction between
subjective probabilities and total appetitive values (F(1,21)= 691, p < 0.00001). By contrast, participants exhibited only a main effect of relative appetitive
values (F(1,21)= 18.5, p < 0.0001): participants exhibited no main effects of subjective probabilities (F(1,21)= 3.0, p= 0.10), and neither main nor
interaction effects associated with total appetitive values (both Fs(1,21) < 1.2, ps > 0.29). See Supplementary Table 1 for model best-ﬁtting parameters and
Supplementary Fig. 2 for model-free analysis. Error bars are s.e.m. over participants (N= 22)
ARTICLE NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-018-08121-w
4 NATURE COMMUNICATIONS |          (2019) 10:301 | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-018-08121-w | www.nature.com/naturecommunications
Simulations of reduced models with no distortions signiﬁcantly
differed from participants’ performances especially in the con-
gruent and incongruent condition and with respect to proposed
rewards (Supplementary Fig. 1).
Using a model falsiﬁcation approach23, we then tested a critical
qualitative prediction from model DIST. This model assumes
choice frequency log-odds log p1p2 between bandits to vary with the
difference between subjective expected utilities of bandits:
log
p1
p2
¼ β ~P1 ~V1  ~P2 ~V2
 
ð1Þ
or equivalently,
log
p1
p2
¼ β
2
~V1 þ ~V2
 
~P1  ~P2
 þ ~P1 þ ~P2  ~V1  ~V2   ð2Þ
where p1, p2 are choice frequencies, ~V1; ~V2 appetitive values
(utilities) and ~P1; ~P2 subjective probabilities of proposed rewards
associated with bandits 1 and 2, respectively. Equation (2)
predicts log-odds log p1p2
 
to exhibit an interaction effect between
total appetitive values ~V1 þ ~V2 and relative probabilities ~P1  ~P2,
along with an additive effect of ~V1  ~V2
 
~P1 þ ~P2
 
. To test this
prediction, we entered choice frequency log-odds from partici-
pants and model DIST simulations in a 2 × 2 × 2 factorial analysis
including as within-subject factors: total values ~V1 þ ~V2
 
(med-
ian split), relative probabilities ~P1  ~P2 ~P1 < ~P2 vs: ~P1 > ~P2
 
and
relative values ~V1  ~V2 ~V1 < ~V2vs: ~V1 > ~V2
 
; due the protocol
reversal structure, ~P1 þ ~P2 was constant across these eight cells
and consequently not included in the analysis). As shown in
Fig. 2d, these log-odds exhibited additive main effects associated
with relative probabilities and values but unlike model DIST,
participants’ log-odds exhibited no interactions between total
appetitive values and relative probabilities. Thus, even though
participants performed according to external reward contingen-
cies as if they computed subjective expected utilities, their
performance varied with subjective probabilities and appetitive
values in a way contradicting this theoretical construct.
We then ﬁtted model DIST+RL to participants’ choices. The
increased complexity of model DIST+RL, however, failed to
improve the ﬁt (BICDIST < BICDIST+RL; T(21)= 0.77, p= 0.44).
Moreover, model DIST+RL assumes choice log-odds to vary as
follows:
log
p1
p2
¼ β
2
~V1 þ ~V2
 
~P1  ~P2
 þ ~P1 þ ~P2  ~V1  ~V2  φþ βðVRL1  VRL2 Þð1 φÞ
ð3Þ
with φ a free parameter weighting subjective expected utilities and
RL-values VRLi , model DIST+RL thus predicts the quantity
log p1p2  βð1 φÞðV
RL
1  VRL2 Þ
h i
to vary with appetitive values
and subjective probabilities as in model DIST. Using the same
factorial analysis as described above, we again found that in
contrast to the prediction, this quantity varied in participants
with no interactions between total appetitive values and subjective
probabilities (Fig. 2e). Thus, neither models DIST/DIST+RL nor
a fortiori all their reductions, including especially the standard
mixture OPT+RL predicting the same interaction effects,
accounted for how participants made choices. A model-free
logistic regression analysis of participants’ choices on protocol
parameters conﬁrmed these results (Supplementary Fig. 2).
We then ﬁtted model MIX to participants’ choices. As model
DIST, model MIX simulations reproduced participants’ choices in
every condition, both in choosing true best bandits along trial
series following reversals (Fig. 3a) and in bandits’ choices
according to proposed rewards (Fig. 3b) (T-tests; all ps>0.05),
while the reduced models failed (Supplementary Fig. 2). Con-
sistently, model MIX ﬁtted participants’ behaviour better than all
its reduced models comprising fewer free parameters (including
especially pure RL and no RL), even when penalising for model
complexity (BIC, MIX vs. reduced models: Ts(21) > 2.92, ps <
0.0082) (Methods). As expected additionally, removing the
divisive normalisation over utilities in model MIX while keeping
the same variables (affective beliefs, proposed rewards and RL
values) also degraded the ﬁt (BICMIX < BICNoNorm, T(21)= 1.65,
p= 0.05, one-tailed).
Fitted parameters in model MIX (Supplementary Table 2)
indicate that participants’ choices strongly maximised the
weighted sum of normalised utilities and affective state
beliefs (inverse temperature β ¼ 54:9; s:e:m ¼ 9:6; lapse rates
ε ¼ 2%; s:e:m: ¼ 1%). Parameters accounting for proposed
reward biases altering state beliefs across conditions matched
their true values, suggesting that participants inferred affective
state beliefs through optimal Bayesian inferences (as in model
OPT) (Fig. 3c). These affective beliefs contributed to choices more
strongly than normalised utilities, as weight parameter ω was
larger than critical value ω0= 0.375 (ω= 0.69, s.e.m.= 0.06; one
sample T-test, T(21)= 4.84, p < 0.001). This ﬁrst indicates that as
expected, participants were risk-adverse and preferentially chose
safer bandits. Second, beliefs contributed to choices as an
additional component of appetitive values rather than through
marginalisation processes. As expected also, RL-values strongly
altered proposed reward utilities (1 φ ¼ 0:8, s.e.m.= 0.07).
Using a model recovery procedure23, we conﬁrmed that even
though both models MIX and DIST reproduced participants’
performances according to external reward contingencies, they
resulted in distinct detectable behaviours (Methods). Critically,
model MIX ﬁtted participants’ choices better than model DIST
and a fortiori, hybrid models DIST+RL and OPT+RL (BICMIX <
BICDIST; < BICDIST+RL; < BICOPT+RL: all Ts(21) > 3.54, ps < 0.005,
non-nested models). Unlike DIST, model MIX indeed predicts
choice log-odds log p1p2 to vary as the addition of relative
normalised utilities and affective beliefs. As described above, we
entered both MIX’s and participants’ choice log-odds in a
factorial analysis including relative normalised utilities v1  v2ð Þ
and affective beliefs B1  B2ð Þ from model MIX, along with total
proposed rewards Vpr1 þ Vpr2 as within-subject factors. We found
that both MIX’s and participants’ choice log-odds varied as the
virtually identical addition of relative utilities and beliefs with no
effects of total proposed rewards (Fig. 3d). Thus, model MIX
accounted for how participants chose bandits from inferred
beliefs, reward expectations and history.
Finally, both model DIST and MIX assume in agreement with
the protocol that participants infer state beliefs rather than
directly learn reward probabilities through RL processes. To
validate this assumption, we ﬁtted the corresponding RL variants
of both models. As expected, we found that both model DIST and
MIX outperformed these variants in predicting participants’
choices (LikelihoodDIST/MIX>Likelihoodany/variants: all Ts(21) >
10.23, ps < 10−8; BICDIST/MIX > BICany/variants: all Ts(21) > 7.39,
ps < 10−6).
fMRI activations. Using fMRI, we investigated the PFC processes
underpinning model MIX. As a necessary (but not sufﬁcient)
condition, brain regions involved in computing choices exhibit
activations varying with decision entropy, i.e., activations increase
when the decision variable becomes more ambiguous30–33.
Model MIX thus predicts these activations to vary as an
inverted, zero-centred U-shape function of decision variable
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1 ωð Þ v1  v2ð Þ þ ω B1  B2ð Þ½  (Methods). To identify these
activations, we therefore entered this decision variable as a
quadratic regressor 1 ωð Þ v1  v2ð Þ þ ω B1  B2ð Þ½ 2 locked at
decision time (bandit onsets) in a multiple-regression analysis of
brain activations factoring out no-interest variables (Methods).
The whole brain analysis (Fig. 4, Supplementary Table 3) revealed
activations in the dorsomedial PFC (dmPFC including the dorsal
anterior cingulate cortex), bilateral PFC (Brodmann area 9/8),
inferior parietal lobules, precuneus, right insular and frontopolar
cortex. In the frontal lobes, however, only dmPFC and right PFC
activations remained signiﬁcant when factoring out reaction
times (Fig. 4, Supplementary Fig. 3). The dmPFC and right PFC
were thus the frontal regions potentially involved in computing
choices.
We more closely examined frontal activations using signiﬁ-
cance thresholds set to p= 0.05 (T-tests) corrected for family-
wise errors over the frontal lobes along with post hoc analyses
removing selection biases34 (Methods). Reaching a decision
requires less processing resources when the decision-relevant
evidence supporting actual choices increase, so that regions
involved in choice computations exhibit decreasing activations
when the decision-relevant evidence supporting actual choices
increase30–33,35. Consequently, model MIX speciﬁcally predicts
these regions to exhibit two additive decreasing effects as
reﬂecting the linear combination of affective state beliefs and
normalised utilities guiding choices: activations should decrease
when affective state beliefs or normalised utilities associated with
chosen bandits increase, with no interactions between these
effects (i.e., when Bchosen and vchosen or equivalently, Bchosen 
Bunchosen and νchosen  νunchosen increase, as these variables are
normalised) (Methods). We then entered (relative) chosen beliefs
and utilities as two linear regressors locked at decision time in a
second multiple-regression analysis factoring out no-interest
variables (Methods). A conjunction (intersection) analysis
revealed only one PFC region exhibiting the addition of the two
predicted negative linear effects, namely the dmPFC region
reported above (Fig. 5, Supplementary Table 4): dmPFC
activations decreased when (relative) chosen beliefs or utilities
increased, with no interactions between these factors (p > 0.05,
uncorrected). This ﬁnding along with the inverted quadratic
effects associated with decision variable 1 ωð Þ v1  v2ð Þ þ
ω B1  B2ð Þ provide evidence that the dmPFC guided choices
based on additively combining state beliefs and normalised
utilities, as predicted by model MIX.
To further investigate PFC regions encoding affective state
beliefs and normalised utilities irrespective of choice computations,
we followed the method described in ref. 31. Accordingly, we
included in the preceding regression analysis two additional
quadratic regressors Bchosen  Bunchosenð Þ2 and vchosen  vunchosenð Þ2
(equal to v1  v2ð Þ2and B1  B2ð Þ2. The rationale is that while the
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linear regressors associated with ðBchosen  BunchosenÞ and ðvchosen 
vunchosenÞ capture the activations reﬂecting choice computations,
these quadratic regressors capture the residual activations coding
for choice-relevant information, irrespective of actual choices.
Indeed, regions coding for belief (utility, resp.) information are
predicted to exhibit activations decreasing with belief entropy
(utility entropy, resp.), i.e., varying as a positive quadratic function
of B1  B2 v1  v2; resp:ð Þ. Such activations simply convey belief
and utility information of one bandit compared with the other
bandit, irrespective of chosen bandits (Methods). The analysis of
participants’ reaction times supports this approach (Fig. 6).
We found activations conveying utility information only in the
dmPFC identiﬁed above (Fig. 7, Supplementary Table 4), whereas
activations conveying belief information were only located in the
ventromedial PFC (vmPFC) or medial orbitofrontal cortex (Fig. 7,
Supplementary Table 4). Consistent with the dominance of
affective state beliefs in model MIX, vmPFC activations were
much larger than dmPFC activations. Across participants,
moreover, vmPFC activations increased with weight ω favouring
affective beliefs in model MIX (r= 0.44, T-test, p= 0.048). Thus,
the dmPFC encoded comparative information about normalised
utilities, while the vmPFC encoded comparative information
about affective state beliefs, irrespective of choice computations.
This dissociation further suggests that the dmPFC functionally
interacts with the vmPFC so that as reported above, affective state
beliefs contribute to choice computations in the dmPFC along
with normalised utilities. We therefore analysed the functional
connectivity between these regions (psychophysiological interac-
tions) and consistently found that similar to the dmPFC
activations reﬂecting choice computations (see Fig. 5), the
correlation between dmPFC and vmPFC activations decreased
when (relative) chosen beliefs increased (Supplementary Fig. 4).
All the effects reported above remained signiﬁcant when the
analysis factored out reaction times. Consistent with previous
ﬁndings (see Discussion), activations were also found to linearly
increased with (relative) chosen utilities. These activations were
located in the vmPFC (Fig. 8a). Importantly, all these results were
properly obtained in full variance regression analyses (Supplemen-
tary Methods). As expected also, additional fMRI analyses revealed
no signiﬁcant brain activations associated with distorted subjective
probabilities posited in model DIST (p>0.01, uncorrected).
Finally, we investigated whether activations associated with
normalised utilities reﬂect proposed rewards, RL-values or both.
This third regression analysis was identical to the preceding one,
except that the linear and quadratic regressor modelling normalised
utilities were each broken down into two regressors modelling
separately RL-values and proposed rewards (Methods). No dmPFC
activations were associated with these component regressors
(Supplementary Table 5), indicating the dmPFC activations
reported above were associated with normalised utilities rather
than these value components. By contrast, vmPFC along with
superior left PFC activations (superior frontal gyrus, BA 8, Frontal
Eyes Field) increased with chosen-relative-to-unchosen proposed
rewards rather than RL-values (Fig. 8b), indicating that vmPFC
activations were actually associated with proposed rewards rather
than normalised utilities. There were no other signiﬁcant effects in
the PFC (Supplementary Table 5) except a positive quadratic effect
associated with relative RL-values in the bilateral orbitofrontal
cortex (laOFC) indicating that laOFC encoded bandits’ relative
RL-values, irrespective of choice computations (Fig. 8b).
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Discussion
Our results conﬁrm that as previously proposed, human adaptive
behaviour in uncertain and changing environments is based on
inferring state beliefs from past action outcomes and immediate
contextual cues (proposed reward biases in the congruent/
incongruent condition)1–4. Our resuts further indicates that the
expected utility theory10 —requiring marginalising reward
expectations over these beliefs—accounts reasonably well for
human choices according to external contingencies, provided that
one assumes choices to derive from subjective probabilities dis-
torting objective probabilities. We replicated previous results
showing that subjective probabilities built upon experience by
under- and over-estimating low and high objective prob-
abilities19, respectively, while reward utilities (appetitive values)
vary as a standard concave function of monetary values29. Con-
sistently, pioneering studies often used this theoretical construct
to investigate the neural bases of human decision-making11,12,14.
However, we found that even though participants performed
according to external contingencies “as if” their choices max-
imised subjective expected utilities, participants’ choices actually
varied with subjective probabilities and utilities in contradiction
to this theoretical construct. Moreover, we observed no neural
evidence supporting the notion of subjective probabilities.
Instead, our results support an alternative decision-making
model (model MIX) based on two key features at variance with
the standard utility theory. First, choices derived from normalised
utilities stemming from an efﬁcient coding mechanism of
context-dependent divisive value normalisation that makes utility
values across choice options to be mutually dependent24–26. The
mechanism was shown to account for human and monkey
choices in static and deterministic environments25,26,36. Our
ﬁndings expand this value-coding mechanism to human
decision-making in changing and uncertain environments
whereby utility values further depend upon the reward history
and combine with state beliefs to guide choices. Consistently, we
found the dmPFC involved in computing choices to exhibit
activations associated with normalised utilities rather than its
value components, namely reward expectations (proposed reward
value) and reward history (RL-values).
Second, choices derived from linearly combining normalised
utilities with undistorted affective state beliefs corresponding to
optimal observer’s beliefs regarding the currently, most frequently
rewarded option. The linear combination generalises the optimal
marginalization process over normalised utilities as the two
processes become equivalent when the linear combination cor-
responds to equal contributions of beliefs and utilities to decision-
making (Methods). However, we found affective state beliefs to
outweigh normalised utilities and to be associated with larger PFC
activations. Moreover, dmPFC activations guiding choices varied
as the additive effects of normalised utilities and affective state
beliefs. Thus, evidence was that choices derive from linearly
combining normalised utilities and affective state beliefs rather
than from marginalising the former over the latter. The dominant
contribution of beliefs over utilities also reﬂects well-known
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Fig. 5 Prefrontal activations involved in computing choices. a Topography of frontal activations negatively correlated with relative chosen normalised
utilities (vchosen–vunchosen) and with relative chosen state beliefs (Bchosen–Bunchosen) with no interactions between these factors (p > 0.05, uncorrected), from
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across participants (N= 21)
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risk-aversion effects in human reward-based decision-
making17,29. Additionally, previous studies involving various
protocols37–39 incidentally found that based on BIC measures,
decision variables linearly combining reward values and prob-
abilities ﬁtted human/monkey behavioural data better than those
computing expected utilities (as in model OPT). Although none
of these studies control for standard distortion and/or belief
formation models along with possible RL inﬂuences on choices,
these previous incidental ﬁndings suggest that the proposed
model is likely to extend to various decision situations.
This model has important conceptual implications. First,
beliefs about reward contingencies bear upon affective states
corresponding to which choice option most surely leads to
rewards (i.e., the safest one) rather than arbitrary-deﬁned abstract
states. Second, affective state beliefs act in decision-making as
appetitive values rather than as abstract probability measures:
choices derive from the independent (additive) contribution of
multiple normalised value components, including normalised
utilities and affective state beliefs. Third, the notion of subjective
probability appears as a theoretical construct reﬂecting the sub-
optimal combination of beliefs and utilities in decision-making
rather than distorted cognitive/neural representations of objective
probabilities. Fourth, risk aversion appears to stem from the
dominant contribution of affective state beliefs to decision-
making and not only from the concavity of utility function as in
the standard expected utility theory29. Whether the present
ﬁndings and particularly, the notion of affective state beliefs
generalise to beliefs bearing upon task dimensions other than
reward probabilities associated with choice options (e.g., reward
magnitude, stimulus or option identity) remains an open question
for future investigation.
Using this more adequate model, we clariﬁed the functional
role of prefrontal regions in decision-making. Over and
above reaction times, ﬁrst, normalised utilities were associated
with dmPFC activations, whereas reward expectations (proposed
rewards) and reward history (RL-values) composing utilities were
associated with vmPFC and laOFC activations, respectively. Thus,
the dmPFC builds and normalises over choice options an overall
utility value of each option based on reward history and expec-
tations rather than represents reward expectations and history
per se. The result subsumes in a single account separate previous
ﬁndings indicating that in protocols inducing action values to
derive either from reward expectations or from reward history,
these unique components of action values are associated with
dmPFC activations32,40,41. Second, evidence was that the dmPFC
is involved in computing choices by linearly combining nor-
malised utilities and affective state beliefs. dmPFC activations
further varied with the unsigned difference between normalised
utilities (or equivalently, with the maximal normalised utility, see
Methods) irrespective of actual choices. This suggests that the
dmPFC compares normalised utilities between choice options
and combines the comparison result with affective state beliefs to
guide the selection. Alternatively but not exclusively, this also
suggests that the dmPFC modulates the engagement in the
decision process according to the maximal utility at stake in each
choice, as previously shown in rule-based decision-making42.
Thus, the dmPFC appears to collect multiple reward-related
variables (proposed rewards, RL-values, affective state beliefs)
that concurrently guide behaviour rather than to integrate these
variables into an overall expected value of control guiding
behaviour43.
Our results reveal that in contrast to normalised utilities,
affective state beliefs are encoded in the vmPFC rather dmPFC,
irrespective of choice computations: vmPFC activations increased
with the quadratic expansion of (relative) chosen beliefs, i.e., with
the unsigned difference between beliefs or the (relative) maximal
belief among choice options. This ﬁnding supports the idea that
the vmPFC is involved in representing latent, hidden states
determining action outcome contingencies7,8,44. We further note
that vmPFC activations exhibited no linear effects associated with
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These analyses of RTs, which constitute a dataset independent of both fMRI activations and choice data used for model ﬁtting validate the approach used
to investigate fMRI. Indeed, our ﬁrst regression analysis of fMRI activations assumes that decision-making is more demanding when the decision variable
becomes more ambiguous, thereby predicting RTs to vary as a quadratic function of decision variable (i.e., with −[(1−ω)(v1−v2)+ω(B1−B2)]2).
Consistently, RTs decreased with quadratic regressor [(1−ω)(v1−v2)+ω(B1−B2)]2 (a: T(21)=6.6; p<0.0001). Our second regression analysis of fMRI
activations further assumes that reaching a decision requires less processing resources, when the evidence supporting actual choices increases. Thus,
model MIX predicts RTs to exhibit two additive decreasing effects: when given normalised utilities, relative chosen affective beliefs (Bchosen–Bunchosen)
increase and, when given affective beliefs, relative chosen normalised utilities (vchosen–vunchosen) increase. We therefore entered RTs in a multiple linear
regression analysis including these two regressors and their interaction as within-subject factors. As predicted, RTs decreased when (Bchosen – Bunchosen) or,
to a lesser extent, (vchosen–vunchosen) increased, with no interactions between these factors (b, c; Bchosen–Bunchosen: T(21)= 4.9, p < 0.0001; vchosen–vunchosen:
T(21)= 2.94, p= 0.0078; interaction: F < 1; difference in linear effects: T(21)= 2.5, p < 0.05,). As in fMRI analyses, we then included quadratic regressors
(Bchosen–Bunchosen)2 and (vchosen–vunchosen)2 as within-subject factors in this analysis. The quadratic regressors presumably capture the encoding of
decision-relevant information irrespective of choice computations and, are consequently predicted to have no inﬂuences on RTs. The results conﬁrmed the
additive decreasing effects of linear regressors (Bchosen–Bunchosen) and (vchosen–vunchosen) (T(21)= 5.2, p < 0.0001 and T(21)= 2.3, p= 0.03, respectively)
with no signiﬁcant effects of quadratic regressors (both Ts(21) < 1.16, ps > 0.26). In summary, RTs conﬁrmed that affective state beliefs and normalised
utilities contributed to decision-making independently with affective state beliefs dominating normalised utilities
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(relative) chosen beliefs. However, we found that consistent with
previous studies using only linear regressors5,12,45, vmPFC acti-
vations correlated with this linear regressor, only when the cor-
responding quadratic regressor was removed or equivalently,
projected onto this linear regressor. This operation arbitrary
assigns the share variance between the two regressors to the linear
one. This shared variance only stems from sampling biases due to
participants’ choices (choices more frequently matched the larger
belief, otherwise the linear and quadratic regressor would be
orthogonal). We then conclude that this linear correlation is likely
to reﬂect a sampling artifact (see Supplementary Methods).
Consistently, Fig. 7c shows that vmPFC activations varied as a
pure quadratic function of (relative) chosen beliefs. Our results
thus qualify previous ﬁndings and show that the vmPFC encodes
the beliefs regarding which option most surely leads to rewards
rather than the beliefs associated with the chosen option. Addi-
tionally, as the quadratic expansion of relative affective state
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Fig. 7 Prefrontal activations encoding normalised utilities and state beliefs.
a Topography of fMRI activations associated with relative normalised
utilities (vchosen−vunchosen)2 (red) and relative state beliefs
(Bchosen−Bunchosen)2 (green) between bandits (Model MIX). Activations are
thresholded at p<0.05 (T-tests, voxel-wise corrected for family-wise errors
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Supplementary Table 4). b Quadratic effect sizes averaged over activation
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removing selection biases). **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001 (T-tests). c Activations
averaged over clusters shown in a and plotted against relative chosen
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scored within participants. Error bars are s.e.m. across participants (N= 21)
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beliefs negatively scales with the risk to choose the less frequently
rewarded option (Methods), our ﬁnding accords with previous
results showing that vmPFC activations predict participants’
conﬁdence judgments46,47.
vmPFC activations also increased with the value of chosen-
relative-to-unchosen proposed rewards. This effect is consistent
with previous studies12,14,48,49 and the view that the vmPFC
encodes the value of stimuli as potential action outcomes50. In the
present protocol, however, this choice-dependent effect is unlikely
to reﬂect decision processes computing choices, as choices
derived predominantly from affective beliefs and normalised
utilities rather than proposed rewards. Moreover, activations
associated with the model decision variable were localised in the
dmPFC rather than vmPFC. Previous results suggest that the
vmPFC instead encode the appetitive value of attended relative to
unattended stimuli51. We therefore interpret this choice-
dependent effect associated with proposed rewards as reﬂecting
the encoding of proposed rewards visually displayed on bandits
modulated by participants’ attention orienting towards the
eventually chosen bandit. Supporting this interpretation, the
frontal eyes ﬁeld (superior lateral PFC, BA8) subserving visual
attention52,53 exhibited a similar effect.
By contrast, laOFC activations varied as the quadratic expan-
sion of relative RL-values between bandits, indicating that laOFC
encode the relative reward history of proposed bandits as cached
variables, irrespective of choices. Consistently, the orbitofrontal
cortex is involved in learning stimulus-reward associations54–57.
Knowing that the functional segregation between laOFC and
vmPFC has long been debated50, the present results indicate that
these regions functionally differ along at least two dimensions: (1)
while the laOFC encodes the retrospective appetitive value, the
vmPFC encodes the prospective appetitive value of available
options; (2) the laOFC encodes values irrespective of actual
choices, whereas the vmPFC encodes values with respect to actual
choices. This segregation conﬁrms that retrospective and pro-
spective values are two functionally distinct components of
option values.
In summary, the fMRI results provide evidence that the orbi-
tofrontal cortex encodes three key components of appetitive
values guiding decision-making. While laOFC encodes the reward
history, the vmPFC encodes reward expectations of available
options along with affective state beliefs regarding which option
most surely leads to rewards. By contrast, the dmPFC including
the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex is involved in computing
choices based on these value components. The dmPFC translates
the reward history and reward expectations into utility values
normalised across choice options and commensurable to affective
state beliefs. Normalised utilities and affective state beliefs then
contribute to decision-making as two additive value components
through the dmPFC. This additive contribution provides a
mechanistic neural account of human choice suboptimality
commonly theorised as deriving from irrational beliefs (subjective
probabilities). Moreover, the dominant contribution of beliefs
over utilities found here accounts for well-known risk aversion
effects in human decision-making. Yet, a remaining issue is to
identify the processes determining the relative contribution of
utilities and beliefs to decision-making. This relative contribution
might reﬂect an overall subjective scaling of outcome values and/
or the encoding strength of affective beliefs with respect to the
instability (i.e., volatility) of external contingencies over time.
Methods
Participants. We recruited 25 subjects (including 13 females and 12 males, aged
20–25 years and right-handed), who volunteered to participate to the study. Par-
ticipants had no general medical, neurological, psychiatric or addictive history as
assessed by medical examinations. Participants provided written informed consent,
and the present study was approved by the French National Ethics Committee
(CPP, Inserm protocol #C07–28). Participants were paid for their participation.
Each participant was tested in three MRI sessions (about 1.5 h each) administered
in separate days. Three participants were excluded because they performed the task
at chance level. An additional participant was excluded for fMRI analyses because
of excessive head-motion. So the ﬁnal sample included 22 individuals for beha-
vioural analyses and 21 individuals for fMRI analyses.
Behavioural protocol. Participants were asked to make successive choices between
two visually presented bandits, a square and a diamond bandit randomly presented
on the left and right sides (Fig. 1a). One bandit led to rewards more frequently than
the other one (frequency= 80% vs. 20%). This advantage reversed episodically and
unpredictably (16, 20, 24 or 28 trials, pseudo-randomly). In every trial, each bandit
proposed a potential monetary reward varying pseudo-randomly from 2 to 10 € (2,
4, 6, 8, 10 €, shown within each shape). These proposed rewards were drawn
independently for each bandit. Both bandits were displayed until participants made
their choice by pressing a hand-held response button (maximal duration 2.5 s).
Participants chose the bandit on the left by pressing the left-handed button and
vice versa. Following participants’ choices, the chosen bandit outcome was visually
revealed during 1 s with zero indicating no rewards. Otherwise, participants
received the proposed reward approximately (the proposed reward with probability
0.5, the proposed reward plus 1 € with probability 0.25 and with probability 0.25,
the proposed reward minus 1 €). The next trial then started after a delay. The time
intervals between protocol events were uniformly jittered (from button presses to
feedbacks onsets: range 0.1–4.1 s; from feedback offsets to next bandit onsets: range
0.5–4.5 s).
Participants performed the task in three experimental conditions administered
in three separate sessions/days. (1) In the neutral condition, proposed rewards were
independent of bandits’ reward frequencies and were uniformly distributed
(Fig. 1b). Thus, state beliefs could be inferred only from previous choice outcomes.
(2) In the congruent condition, proposed rewards were biased towards higher
values for the more frequently rewarded bandit according to an exponential-like
distribution with slope γ= 0.13 (Fig. 1b, see computational modelling below).
Conversely, proposed rewards were biased towards lower values for the less
frequently rewarded bandit according to an exponential distribution with slope −γ.
The exponential bias was chosen so that the information (in bits) conveyed by
proposed rewards about bandit reward frequencies varied as a linear function of
reward monetary values. (3) In the incongruent condition, proposed rewards were
biased in the exact opposite direction (γ=−0.13 Fig. 1b). In both the congruent
and incongruent conditions, thus, proposed rewards identically convey some
additional information about state beliefs, i.e., bandits’ reward frequencies. In both
these conditions, state beliefs could be inferred from previous choice outcomes and
proposed rewards.
Order of conditions/sessions was counterbalanced across participants. Each
session comprised 400 trials and 19 reversals. Each session was broken down in
four scanning runs separated by short breaks. Before each session, participants
were only instructed that bandits had distinct reward frequencies and these
frequencies reversed episodically. Additionally, participants were instructed that
after each session, eight trials will be randomly drawn and the monetary rewards
received during these trials will be added to their ﬁnal pay-offs. Finally, participants
were trained on the task before each session. The training protocol was identical to
the experimental protocol, except that it includes only 50 trials and 2 reversals.
Thus, participants could familiarise and learn bandits’ and protocol contingencies.
All experimental and training sessions were administered using the MATLAB
PsychToolBox58.
Optimal model OPT. We denote 1 and 2 the two bandits. Formally, the protocol
consists of a sequence of hidden statesz1; z2; ¼ ; zt 2 1; 2f g, where zt= 1 (=2,
resp.) means that in trial t, bandit 1 (2, resp.) is the rewarded bandit with prob-
ability qM and bandit 2 (1, resp.) is the rewarded bandit with probability qm (qM
and qm equal to 80% and 20%, respectively)·)27. We denote V1(t) and V2(t) the
proposed rewards (monetary values) in trial t associated with bandit 1 and 2,
respectively. In this protocol, the proposed rewards are drawn from distribu-
tions p V1 tð Þjztð Þ and p V2 tð Þjztð Þ:
p V1 tð Þjztð Þ /
exp γ V1 tð Þ  vð Þð Þ if zt ¼ 1;
exp γ V1 tð Þ  vð Þð Þ otherwise;

p V2 tð Þjztð Þ /
exp γ V2 tð Þ  vð Þð Þ if zt ¼ 2;
exp γ V2 tð Þ  vð Þð Þ otherwise;

where, v denotes the mean reward (because only ratios between bandits are
meaningful, quantity v has no inﬂuence on choices: see below). Parameter γ is a
constant: (i) γ= 0 corresponds to the neutral condition (proposed rewards are
uninformative about hidden states); (ii)γ > 0 corresponds to the congruent con-
dition (proposed rewards are biased towards higher values for the most frequently
rewarded bandit and vice-versa); (iii)γ < 0 corresponds to the incongruent condi-
tion (proposed rewards are biased towards lower values for the most frequently
rewarded bandit and vice versa).
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In each trial t, the model chooses between two actions, at= 1 (choosing bandit
1) or at= 2 (choosing bandit 2). Then, the model receives a feedback xt 2 0; 1f g
indicating whether the proposed reward is obtained (xt= 1) or not (xt= 0). The
model has beliefs Bz(t) at trial t onset about hidden states zt, given all past
observations. The model then observes proposed rewards r= {V1 tð Þ, V2 tð Þ} in trial
t, and updates her/his beliefs BZ tjrð Þ, which write as follows:
B1 tjrð Þ / eγ V1 tð ÞV2 tð Þð ÞB1 tð Þ
B2 tjrð Þ / eγ V2 tð ÞV1 tð Þð ÞB2 tð Þ:
Normalization terms so that B1 tjrð Þ þ B2 tjrð Þ ¼ 1ð Þ are omitted for simplicity.
The model then computes reward probabilities associated with each bandit by
marginalising over beliefs BZ tjrð Þ. Accordingly, inferred reward probabilities
associated with choosing bandit 1 (bandit 2), denoted P1ðtÞ; (P2(t), resp.) write as
follows:
P1ðtÞ ¼ qM B1 tjrð Þ þ qmB2 tjrð Þ
P2ðtÞ ¼ qmB1 tjrð Þ þ qMB2 tjrð Þ
The model then computes bandits’ expected utilities EU by integrating reward
probabilities and values:
EU at ¼ 1ð Þ ¼ V1 tð ÞP1ðtÞ
EU at ¼ 2ð Þ ¼ V2 tð ÞP2ðtÞ
The model selects the bandit (soft)maximising expected utility: probabilities p1 and
p2 of choosing bandit 1 and 2, respectively, write as the following softmax function:
p1 ¼ 1 εð ÞsigmoidβðV1 tð ÞP1 tð Þ  V2 tð ÞP2 tð ÞÞ þ
ε
2
p2 ¼ 1 p1
where β is the inverse temperature and ε the lapse rate. The larger β and the lower ε
the more optimal is the choice. After choosing a bandit, the model observes
feedback xt and updates again her/is beliefs BZ tjr; xð Þ as follows:
B1 tjr; xð Þ / qIðtÞM q1IðtÞm B1 tjrð Þ
B2 tjr; xð Þ / q1IðtÞM qIðtÞm B2 tjrð Þ;
where exponent I tð Þ ¼ xt 2 atð Þ þ 1 xtð Þ at  1ð Þ is equal to 0 or 1 depending
upon the chosen bandit at ¼ 1 or 2ð Þ and its outcome xt ¼ 0 or 1ð Þ. Finally, beliefs
formed in trial t serve to form beliefs in next trial t+1 according to the volatility of
the environment:
B1 t þ 1ð Þ ¼ 1 νð ÞB1 tjr; xð Þ þ νB2 tjr; xð Þ
B2 t þ 1ð Þ ¼ νB1 tjr; xð Þ þ ð1 νÞB2 tjr; xð Þ
where v represents the volatility of the environment, i.e., the probability that a
reversal occurs between two successive trials ztþ1 ≠ zt
 
11. Because episode lengths
are pseudo-randomized within sessions, volatility v is assumed to be a constant. In
trials with no responses, beliefs were updated based on proposed rewards and
volatility only.
In summary, beliefs evolve from trial to trial as follows:
B1 t þ 1ð Þ
B2 t þ 1ð Þ
	 

/ 1 ν ν
ν 1 ν
	 

qIðtÞM q
1IðtÞ
m 0
0 q1IðtÞM q
IðtÞ
m
 !
eγ V1 tð ÞV2 tð Þð Þ 0
0 eγ V2 tð ÞV1 tð Þð Þ
 !
B1 tð Þ
B2 tð Þ
	 

;
zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{B tjr;xð Þzﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{
B tjr;xð Þ
inferred reward probabilities write as follows:
P1 tð Þ
P2 tð Þ
	 

¼ qM qm
qm qM
	 

B1 tjrð Þ
B2 tjrð Þ
	 

;
and choice probabilities as the following softmax function:
pi ¼ 1 εð ÞsigmoidβðViPi tð Þ  VjPj tð ÞÞ þ
ε
2
; i ¼ 1; 2; j ¼ 3 i:
Finally, model OPT predicts log-odds of choice frequencies to vary as follows
(assuming lapse rate ε 1):
log
p1
p2
’ β V1ðtÞP1ðtÞ  V2ðtÞP2ðtÞð Þ
¼ β
2
P1 tð Þ þ P2ðtÞð Þ V1ðtÞ  V2ðtÞð Þ þ V1ðtÞ þ V2ðtÞð Þ P1ðtÞ  P2ðtÞð Þ½  ð4Þ
¼ β
2
qM þ qmð Þ V1ðtÞ  V2ðtÞð Þ þ V1ðtÞ þ V2ðtÞð Þ P1ðtÞ  P2ðtÞð Þ½ 
The third equation line is obtained using P1 tð Þ þ P2ðtÞ ¼ qM þ qm. In the present
protocol featuring constant bandits’ reward frequencies qM; qm, choice frequency
log-odds thus vary as the addition of relative reward values to the interaction
between total reward values and relative inferred probabilities. Note that if
V1 tð Þ;V2ðtÞ were normalised V1 tð Þ þ V2 tð Þ ¼ constantð Þ, log-odds would vary as
a linear combination of relative reward values and probabilities. Note ﬁnally that
reward frequencies ðqM; qmÞ have a quadratic inﬂuence on how log-odds vary
across two successive trials as a result of updating and marginalising over beliefs.
In the present protocol, quantities qM; qm; γ; ν are constant (true values:
qM ¼ 0:8; qm ¼ 0:2; γneutral ¼ 0;γcongruent¼0:13; γincongruent ¼ 0:13; ν ¼ 0:05).
Consistent with the training phase preceding each experimental session, a more
sophisticated model that further learns/infers these constants did not improve the
ﬁt of participants’ data signiﬁcantly. In the main text, model OPT conceptually
refers to this optimal model with qM ; qm; γn; γc; γi; ν set at their true values and the
softmax set as hardmax β! þ1 and ε ¼ 0ð Þ. When ﬁtted to data, however, we
treated qM ; qm ¼ 1 qM ; γn; γc; γi; ν as free parameters along with softmax free
parameters β and ε. We refer to this parameterised version of model OPT as
parameterised model OPT.
Distortion model DIST. Model DIST assumes inferred reward probabilities of
bandits P1(t) and P2(t) are distorted as reﬂecting a misrepresentation of objective
probabilities (subjective probabilities). As these reward probabilities are linear
combinations of state beliefs B1 tjrð Þand B2 tjrð Þ, one may equivalently assume that
distortions apply to beliefs.
We used the standard distortion function encompassing previously documented
distortions (convex, concave, S-shaped and inverted S-shaped)21, which writes as
follows:
log
~P
1 ~P ¼ η log
P
1 P þ 1 ηð Þ log
P0
1 P0
where ~P denotes subjective probabilities and P objective probabilities from model
OPT. η > 0 and P0 0<P0 < 1ð Þ are two parameters specifying distortions: η= 1
means no distortions. When η > 1, the subjective probability is a S-shaped function
of objective probability. When η < 1, the subjective probability is an inverted S-
shaped function of objective probability. In both cases, the equivalence point where
subjective and objective probability are identical is P0: when P0 ! 0 or 1; the
distortion function becomes simply convex or concave.
For completeness, we also used this distortion function (with distinct
parameters) for monetary values of proposed rewards V to account for the
possibility that subjective utility (or appetitive values) of proposed rewards is not a
linear function of monetary values (monetary values were rescaled for varying from
0 to 1). Accordingly, model DIST is identical to model OPT except that the
computation of expected utilities is now based on distorted probabilities and
distorted monetary values:
EU at ¼ 1ð Þ ¼ ~V1 tð Þ~P1ðtÞ
EU at ¼ 2ð Þ ¼ ~V2 tð Þ~P2ðtÞ
Compared with parameterised model OPT, model DIST comprises four additional
free parameters: η and P0 for probabilities and values. Note that like parameterised
model OPT, all parameters in model DIST were constant across the neutral,
congruent and incongruent conditions, except proposed reward biases γ, of course.
Finally, we can deduce from choice frequency log-odds of model OPT (see
above) that model DIST predicts log-odds of choice frequencies to vary as follows
(assuming lapse rate ε 1):
log
p1
p2
’ β
2
~P1 tð Þ þ ~P2 tð Þ
 
~V1 tð Þ  ~V2 tð Þ
 þ ~V1 tð Þ þ ~V2 tð Þ  ~P1 tð Þ  ~P2 tð Þ  
Reduced models from model DIST. To validate the addition of distortion para-
meters to model OPT, we considered the three reduced models nested in model
DIST: (1) one removing distortions on reward values; (2) one removing distortions
on reward probabilities; (3) and one corresponding to parameterised model OPT,
i.e., with no distortions on both values and probabilities.
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Hybrid model DIST+RL. We also considered the extension of model OPT com-
prising an additional reinforcement-learning (RL) component altering subjective
expected utilities. In this model, choice probabilities pi write as the following
softmax function:
pi ¼ 1 εð Þsigmoidβ φ ~Vi tð Þ~Pi tð Þ  ~Vj tð Þ~Pj tð Þ
 
þ ð1 φÞðVRLi tð Þ  VRLj tð ÞÞ
 
þ ε
2
with φ a weight parameter (i= 1,2; j= 3-i) . VRLi tð Þ denotes the RL value for bandit
i in trial t, deriving from the standard Rescorla & Wagner learning rule28:
VRLch tð Þ ¼ VRLch t  1ð Þ þ α Rt1  VRLch t  1ð Þ
 
where a is the learning rate, Rt-1 the actual reward received in trial t-1. Index ch
indicates that the rule applies to the chosen bandit only. In trials with no responses,
RL-values remained unchanged.
Alternative model MIX. Model MIX assumes no distortions. Hidden
statesz1; z2; ¼ ; zt 2 1; 2f g now represent affective states: zt ¼ 1 (= 2, resp.)
means that in trial t, bandit 1 (2, resp.) is the most frequently rewarded bandit
(corresponding to probability qM and bandit 2 (1, resp.) is the least rewarded
bandit (corresponding to probability qm). Model MIX assumes that choices derive
from the additive contribution of normalised utilities and affective state beliefs.
Consequently, choice probabilities p1 and p2 of choosing bandit 1 and 2, respec-
tively, varies as a softmax function of the sum of normalised utilities vi tð Þ and state
beliefs Bi tjrð Þ as indicated below:
p1 ¼ 1 εð Þsigmoidβ 1 ωð Þðv1 tð Þ  v2 tð ÞÞ þ ω B1 tjrð Þ  B2 tjrð Þð Þ½  þ
ε
2
p2 ¼ 1 p1;
where ω is a weighting parameter. As previously proposed25,26, utilities v1, v2 of
choice options corresponds to proposed rewards altered by the reward history and
normalised across the two choice options:
vi tð Þ ¼
φVpri tð Þ þ ð1 φÞVRLi tð ÞP
i¼1;2 φV
pr
i tð Þ þ ð1 φÞVRLi tð Þ
; for i ¼ 1; 2:
In this expression, the ﬁrst term Vpri tð Þrepresents the proposed monetary reward,
while the second term VRLi tð Þ represents the RL value for bandit i in trial t.
Constant φ is simply a weighting parameter. Note that with no loss of generality,
utilities are normalised to 1 i:e: v1 tð Þ þ v2 tð Þ ¼ 1ð Þ. Reinforcement values VRLi tð Þ
derive from the standard Rescorla & Wagner learning rule as in hybrid model DIST
+RL (see above)28.
Model MIX assumes that state beliefs are inferred as in model OPT. Compared
with model parameterised OPT, consequently, model MIX comprises three
additional free parameters: weighting constants ω; φ; and learning rate α. Note
again that as in model OPT and DIST, all parameters in model MIX were constant
across the neutral, congruent and incongruent conditions (except proposed-reward
biases γ, of course). We further veriﬁed that, using Bayesian Information Criteria,
ﬁtting distinct weight parameters ω, φ across the three conditions led to no
improvements in ﬁtting experimental data.
Finally, model MIX predicts log-odds of choice frequencies to vary as the
additive effects of normalised utilities and affective beliefs (assuming lapse rate
ε 1) (see Fig. 2c):
log
p1
p2
’ β 1 ωð Þ v1  v2ð Þ þ ω B1 tjrð Þ  B2 tjrð Þð Þ½ : ð5Þ
Note that in model MIX, reward frequencies ðqM ; qmÞ have a linear inﬂuence on
how log-odds vary across two successive trials as a result of beliefs’ updating only
(see mathematical derivations for model OPT).
Special case ω ¼ ω0. Model MIX further features a special case when
ω ¼ ω0 ¼ qMqmqMþqmþqMqm . In that case, model MIX is equivalent to model OPT with
normalised utilities and affective state beliefs, and vice versa. Indeed, consider ﬁrst
choice log-odds from model OPT with normalised utilities, which write as follow
(see Eq. (4) above):
log
p1
p2
’ β
2
P1 tð Þ þ P2 tð Þð Þ v1  v2ð Þ þ v1 þ v2ð Þ P1 tð Þ  P2 tð Þð Þ½  ð6Þ
where P1 tð Þ; P2 tð Þ are inferred reward probabilities deriving from marginalizing
over affective state beliefs B1 tjrð Þ;B2 tjrð Þ:
P1ðtÞ ¼ qMB1 tjrð Þ þ qmB2 tjrð Þ
P2ðtÞ ¼ qmB1 tjrð Þ þ qMB2 tjrð Þ
Note that B1 tjrð Þ þ B2 tjrð Þ ¼ 1 and consequently,
P1 tð Þ þ P2 tð Þ ¼ qM þ qm
P1 tð Þ  P2 tð Þ ¼ qM  qmð Þ B1 tjrð Þ  B2 tjrð Þð Þ
As v1 þ v2 ¼ 1, Eq. (6) is therefore equivalent to:
log
p1
p2
’ β
2
qM þ qmð Þ v1  v2ð Þ þ qM  qmð Þ B1 tjrð Þ  B2 tjrð Þð Þ½ 
¼ β
2
qM þ qmð Þ þ qM  qmð Þ½ 
qM þ qmð Þ
qM þ qmð Þ þ qM  qmð Þ
v1  v2ð Þ þ
qM  qmð Þ
qM þ qmð Þ þ qM  qmð Þ
B1 tjrð Þ  B2 tjrð Þð Þ
 
¼ βqM 1
qM  qmð Þ
qM þ qmð Þ þ qM  qmð Þ
	 

v1  v2ð Þ þ
qM  qmð Þ
qM þ qmð Þ þ qM  qmð Þ
B1 tjrð Þ  B2 tjrð Þð Þ
 
Consequently, Eq. (6) writes as follow:
log
p1
p2
’ βqM 1 ω0ð Þ v1  v2ð Þ þ ω0 B1 tjrð Þ  B2 tjrð Þð Þ½  ð7Þ
with ω0 ¼ qMqmð ÞqMþqmð Þþ qMqmð Þ. Eq. (7) is identical to Eq. (5) describing choice log-odds
from model MIX with ω= ω0 (with inverse temperature βqM). Thus, model OPT
with normalised utilities and affective state beliefs is equivalent to model MIX with
ω= ω0, and vice versa: maximising a weighted sum of normalised utilities and
affective state beliefs with weight parameter ω0 is equivalent to maximising the
expected values of normalised utilities.
Reduced models from model MIX. To validate the mixture comprising state
beliefs, proposed rewards and RL values, we considered the six reduced models
nested in model MIX: (1) one comprising only state beliefs (ω= 1); (2) one
comprising no state beliefs (ω= 0); (3) one comprising only proposed rewards
ðω ¼ 0;φ ¼ 1Þ; (4) one comprising no proposed rewards ðφ ¼ 0Þ, i.e., comprising
only RL-values and beliefs; (5) one comprising only RL values (pure RL); (6) and
ﬁnally, one comprising no RL values ðφ ¼ 1Þ, i.e., comprising only proposed
rewards and beliefs.
Relative affective state beliefs and conﬁdence in choosing the more fre-
quently rewarded option. Lebreton et al.47 show that subjects’ conﬁdence in their
choices, which correlates with vmPFC activations, negatively scales with the var-
iance of the distribution coding for the variable guiding choices. Here, we show that
the unsigned difference between state beliefs, which correlated with vmPFC acti-
vations, matches this notion of conﬁdence: namely, the quadratic expansion of
relative affective state beliefs negatively scales with the variance between effective
reward probabilities associated with bandits. Consider bandit 1 and its effective
reward probability P1, which is equal to qM with probability B1 and qm with
probability B2. The expected value of P1 denoted E(P1) is simply equal to E P1ð Þ ¼
qMB1 þ qmB2: We can therefore write E P1  P2ð Þ ¼ qM  qmð Þ B1  B2ð Þ, where
index 2 refers to bandit 2. The variance of P1–P2 then writes as
follow:
Var P1  P2ð Þ ¼ E P1  P2ð Þ2 E P1  P2ð Þð Þ2
¼ qM  qmð Þ2B1 þ qm  qMð Þ2B2  qM  qmð Þ2 B1  B2ð Þ2¼ qM  qmð Þ2 1 B1  B2ð Þ2
 
Thus, the risk to choose the less frequently reward bandit, which varies with
Var P1  P2ð Þ,
negatively scales with the quadratic expansion of relative state beliefs.
Model ﬁtting and comparison. For adjusting model-free parameters, all models
were ﬁtted to experimental data separately for each participant by maximising the
model log-likelihood (LLH):
LLH ¼
X
t
log pchðtÞ
where pchðtÞ is the model choice probability of participant’s choice ch in trial t,
given previous participant’s choices. The three conditions were ﬁtted together, with
all parameters constant across conditions, except naturally reward distribution
slope γ ¼ γn; γc; γi . See Supplementary Tables 1 and 2 for best-ﬁtting parameters in
model DIST and MIX, respectively. To maximise LLH, we used a slice sampling
procedure with uniform priors over large parameter ranges59, which is computa-
tionally costly but appropriate for high-dimensional parameters spaces as pro-
viding estimates of each parameter posterior distribution. We ensured that samples
were independent enough so that parameters’ estimates were reliable. Finally, we
carried out a gradient ascent starting from the best sample to get optimised esti-
mates of parameters maximising LLH. We compared model ﬁts by computing
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Bayesian Information Criteria for each model and making pairwise T-tests with
participants treated as random factors (Supplementary Table 6). BICs penalise for
model complexity based on the number of free parameters59.
Model recovery procedure. We also veriﬁed the ability of the present protocol
and the validity of our ﬁtting procedure to discriminate between model DIST and
MIX by using a model recovery procedure. We generated synthetic data by
simulating the performance of models DIST and MIX, using parameters ﬁtted on
every participant for these simulations. Then we ﬁtted models DIST and MIX on
these synthetic data as if they were participants’ data, using the exact same ﬁtting
procedure described above. We found that as expected, model DIST ﬁts its own
performance data better than model MIX and vice-versa (LLH: both Ts(21) > 4.98,
ps < 0.00002).
fMRI data acquisition and processing. fMRI volumes were acquired on a 3T
Siemens Trio at the Centre de Neuroimagerie de Recherche (CENIR) in hospital La
Pitié Salpêtrière, Paris, France. Functional images were acquired with parameters
TR= 2 s, TE= 25 ms, Nb of repetitions/run= 431, Nb slices= 39, thickness= 2
mm, ﬂip angle 75°, voxel size= 2.5 mm3. Before the ﬁrst trial, two TR of baseline
recording were acquired for subsequent slice-timing correction. Echo planar
images were 30° tilted to minimise signal drop around the orbitofrontal cortex60.
Stimuli were projected on a mirror settled on a 32-channels head coil. T1 anato-
mical images were also acquired before functional acquisitions. Each experimental
condition (neutral, congruent and incongruent) was recorded in separate days and
comprised four scanning runs.
MRI data were processed and analysed using SPM8 software package (http://
www.ﬁl.ion.ucl.ac.uk) using standard slice-timing, spatial realignment,
normalisation to Montreal Neurological Institute echo planar imaging template
(images resampled at 3 mm3) and Gaussian spatial smoothing (isotropic 6-mm
kernel). Temporal correlations were estimated using restricted maximum
likelihood estimates of variance components using a ﬁrst-order autoregressive
model. The resulting non-sphericity was used to form maximum likelihood
estimates of the activations. Only head movements below 3–5 mm or 3–5° were
accepted, thereby excluding one participant.
fMRI statistical analyses. Statistical parametric maps of local brain activations
were computed in every subject using the standard general linear model (GLM).
The model included separate event-related regressors, which convolved a series
of delta function with the canonical haemodynamic response function (HRF)
that estimated BOLD responses at stimulus and feedback onsets. Regressors of
no interest included trials with no responses (0.6% of all trials), six motion
parameters from the realignment procedure, along with regressors modelling
each run. The three conditions were analysed with a unique GLM. Event-related
regressors of interest were parametrically modulated by variables derived from
model MIX ﬁtted on behavioural data. Parametric modulations at stimulus
onsets included linear and quadratic expansions of relative state beliefs and
normalised utilities derived from model MIX. All parametric modulations were
z-scored to ensure between-subjects and between-regressors comparability of
regression coefﬁcients (quadratic regressors were z-scored after applying the
quadratic transformation). We ensured that Variance Inﬂation Factor assessing
collinearity between all parametric modulators were small enough61 to allow
proper dissociations. Thus, shared variances (coefﬁcient of determination R2)
between state beliefs and normalised utilities were equal to 0.17 and 0.02 for
linear and quadratic expansions, respectively. Importantly, GLMs were per-
formed in complete full variance with no orthogonalisation (by deactivating the
SPM default orthogonalisation option), so that all shared variance across
regressors were placed in residuals and observed activations were speciﬁc to each
parametric modulation (Supplementary Methods). We systematically performed
control analyses for reaction times: in all GLMs, we further included along with
regressors of interest an additional parametric regressor factoring out reaction
times. All results reported in the main text remained unchanged when including
this additional regressor.
Following the standard SPM method, second-level parametric maps were then
obtained for each contrast over the group of participants. Activated voxels were
identiﬁed using a signiﬁcance voxel-wise threshold set at p < 0.05 (T-tests)
corrected for family-wise errors for multiple comparison over the search volumes
(see below). Statistical inferences were based on cluster level: signiﬁcant activations
were identiﬁed as clusters of activated voxels with signiﬁcance cluster-wise
threshold set at p < 0.05. We removed selection biases from all post hoc analyses
performed from activation clusters using a leave-one-out procedure34: for every
GLM, the partial correlation coefﬁcients (betas) of each participant were averaged
over activation clusters identiﬁed in the N-1 remaining participants (using the
signiﬁcance thresholds indicated above); these coefﬁcients were then entered in
post hoc analyses across the sample of N participants. Three regression analyses
were carried out:
1-GLM: Decision entropy  ð1 ωÞ v1  v2ð Þ þ ω B1  B2ð Þ½ 2 between bandits
1 and 2 was the unique parametric modulation at stimulus (bandit) onsets.
Parametric modulations at feedback onsets included relative chosen beliefs
Bch  Bun, RL-values VRLch and feedback values, where indexes ch and un refer to
the chosen and unchosen bandit in trial t, respectively. This analysis was performed
over the whole brain. Given this search volume and the resulting FWE-correction
over voxel-wise T-values, the cluster-wise threshold set at p < 0.05 then
corresponded to a cluster size k>10 voxels (0.27 cm3).
To identify regions involved in choice computations, we used the quadratic
rather than modulus operator of decision variable
i:e: ð1 ωÞ v1  v2ð Þ þ ω B1  B2ð Þ½ 2
 
based on the following rationale. Previous
results show fMRI activity to vary with the area under evidence accumulation
traces in sequential sampling models of decision-making33. As these traces form on
average linear increases which slope scales with the decision variable, the area
under these traces then vary as an inverted quadratic function of the decision
variable. Anyway, using a modulus operator provided virtually identical results
(Supplementary Fig. 5a).
2-GLM: parametric modulations at stimulus (bandit) onsets included relative
chosen beliefs Bch  Bun, relative chosen utilities vch  vun, their interaction ðBch 
BunÞðvch  vunÞ and their quadratic expansion Bch  Bunð Þ2 and vch  vunð Þ2.
Parametric modulations at feedback onsets were as in GLM#1 above. This analysis
was performed over the frontal lobes only (MNI coordinate Y > 0). Given this
search volume and the resulting FWE-correction over voxel-wise T-values, the
cluster-wise threshold set at p < 0.05 then corresponded to a cluster size k > 40
voxels (1.08 cm3).
Note that as utilities and beliefs are normalised variables, one may indifferently
use linear regressors (Bch – Bun), (vch – vun) or Bch, vch. Indeed, Bchosen ¼
1
2 1þ Bchosen  Bunchosenð Þ and vchosen ¼ 12 1þ vchosen  vunchosenð Þ. Similarly,
quadratic expansions Bch  Bunð Þ2 and vch  vunð Þ2 modelling coding information
or negative entropy associated with beliefs and utilities identically reﬂect the
encoding of maximal beliefs Bmax and utilities vmax or relative maximal beliefs
Bmax  Bminð Þ and utilities (vmax–vmin. Indeed, Xmax ¼ 12 1þ X1  X2j jð Þ and
Xmin ¼ 12 1 X1  X2j jð Þ when X1+X2= 1). In any case, activations correlating
with these quadratic regressors convey belief and utility information of one bandit
compared with the other bandit, irrespective of chosen bandits. We used quadratic
expansions as they better approximate entropy function than modulus operators
(unsigned differences between beliefs and between utilities). Using modulus
operators provided virtually identical results (Supplementary Fig. 5b). See
additional details in Supplementary Methods.
3-GLM: parametric modulations at stimulus (bandits) onsets included
relative chosen beliefs Bch  Bun, relative chosen proposed rewards Vprch  Vprun,
relative chosen RL-values VRLch  VRLun and their quadratic expansion
Bch  Bunð Þ2, Vprch  Vprun
 2
and VRLch  VRLun
 2
. Parametric modulations at
feedback onsets were as in GLM#1 above. As in GLM#2, this analysis was
performed over the frontal lobes only (MNI coordinate Y>0). Consequently, the
cluster-wise threshold set at p < 0.05 again corresponded to a cluster size k>40
voxels (1.08 cm3).
Reporting summary. Further information on experimental design is available in
the Nature Research Reporting Summary linked to this article.
Data availability
fMRI data are available at the NeuroVault data repository: neurovault.org, col-
lection ID: MIX. URL: neurovault.org/collections/YFISTKGF. Behavioral data are
available from the authors upon request. A reporting summary for this article is
available as a Supplementary Information ﬁle.
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